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ABSTRACT 
Android malware has been on the rise in recent years due to the increasing 
popularity of Android and the proliferation of third party application 
markets. Emerging Android malware families are increasingly adopting 
sophisticated detection avoidance techniques and this calls for more 
effective approaches for Android malware detection. Hence, in this paper 
we present and evaluate an n-gram opcode features based approach that 
utilizes machine learning to identify and categorize Android malware. This 
approach enables automated feature discovery without relying on prior 
expert or domain knowledge for pre-determined features. Furthermore, by 
using a data segmentation technique for feature selection, our analysis is 
able to scale up to 10-gram opcodes. Our experiments on a dataset of 2520 
samples showed an f-measure of 98% using the n-gram opcode based 
approach. We also provide empirical findings that illustrate factors that have 
probable impact on the overall n-gram opcodes performance trends. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Android malware is an increasing problem due to its growing popularity and 
the ability of users to install applications from various application markets 
and third-party sources. The volume of new applications appearing 
frequently is too large for manual examination of each application for 
malicious behavior to be feasible. Hence, this process does not scale very 
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easily to large numbers of applications. Previous studies have also shown 
that traditional signature-based approaches, which most antivirus scanners 
employ, fails to be effective at detecting new malware due to their 
increasing adoption of sophisticated detection avoidance techniques and the 
need for frequent update of signature databases. 
 
Android malware detection is currently an active area of research. 
Consequently, there is a growing volume of work on automated detection 
incorporating machine learning techniques. Various methods have been 
proposed based on examining the dynamic application behavior (Zhao et al., 
2011; Shabtai et al., 2012; Burguera et al. 2011), requested permissions (Liu 
& Liu, 2014; Sanz et al., 2012; Sharma & Dash, 2014; Chan & Song, 2014; 
Pehlivan et al., 2014; Rovelli & Vigfusson, 2014), API calls (Sharma & 
Dash, 2014; Yerima et al. 2015a; Yerima et al., 2015b; Dong-Jie et al., 
2012; Chan & Song, 2014) etc. However these methods are often still 
largely reliant on expert analysis or domain knowledge to design or 
determine the discriminative features that are passed to the machine learning 
system used to make the final classification decision. 
 
Some recent works have applied static opcode features to the problem of 
Android malware detection (Jerome et al, 2014; Kang et al., 2013; Canfora 
et al., 2015a; Canfora et al., 2015b; Varsha et al., 2016; Puerta et al., 2015; 
Canfora et al. 2015c). Out of these, only Jerome et al, (2014) and Canfora et 
al., (2015a) have investigated n-gram extracted from the disassembled 
application bytecode as a means for Android malware detection. The 
advantage of the use of an opcode based technique is the ability to 
automatically learn features from raw data directly rather than specifying 
them beforehand through expert analysis.  For example, in previous works 
such as Yerima et al. (2015a) or Chan and Song (2014) where the 
discriminative features are based on API calls, expert analysis provides the 
selection of the ‘most interesting’ features (i.e. API calls methods, 
signatures, etc.). Unlike the opcode based techniques, this could limit the 
scope of the application of machine learning algorithms by excluding 
potentially useful learning information. 
 
Hence, in this paper we investigate n-gram opcode analysis for Android 
malware detection using machine learning on real datasets. We study this 
approach and analyze its efficacy for both malware detection and also 
malware categorization (i.e. classification into known families). Unlike 
previous works that experimented with opcodes of up to 5-grams only, the 
work presented in this paper analyzed up to 10-grams whilst also 
considering both their frequencies and binary counts. We also some provide 
empirical findings that correlate with trends observed in the overall 
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performance of the n-gram opcodes on the experimental dataset. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews related work; Section 3 
presents the n-gram opcode analysis technique; the evaluation experiments 
and discussions are presented in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
In this section we review related work on Android malware detection. The 
two main approaches commonly applied to malware detection are static 
analysis and dynamic analysis. Static analysis involves disassembling the 
application in order to extract features, while dynamic analysis involves 
running the application in an emulator or instrumented hardware in order to 
extract characteristic actions performed by the application. Static analysis 
has the advantage of being faster and may enable greater code coverage than 
dynamic analysis, while dynamic analysis may be less prone to code 
obfuscation. Some previous works such as Lindorfer, Neugschwandtner, 
and Platzer (2015); Titze, Stephanow, and Schütte (2013); Wei, Gomez, 
Neamtu, and Faloutsos (2012) have combined the two approaches. 
 
Learning based approaches using hand-designed (pre-defined) features have 
been applied extensively to both dynamic (Zhao et al., 2011; Shabtai et al., 
2012; Burguera et al., 2011; Su et al., 2012; Dini et al., 2012; Afonso et al., 
2015) and static malware detection (Sharma & Dash, 2014; Yerima et al. 
2015a; Yerima et al., 2015b; Dong-Jie et al., 2012; Chan & Song, 2014). 
For example, Yerima et al. (2015a) studied a static analysis approach to 
Android malware detection based on 179 features derived from API calls, 
intents, permissions and commands that were combined with ensemble 
learning. Their approach was evaluated on a dataset of 2925 malware 
samples and 3938 benign samples. A variety of similar approaches to static 
malware detection have used similarly derived features, but with different 
classifiers such as support vector machine (SVM) (Arp et al., 2014), Naïve 
Bayes (Yerima et al., 2014), and k-nearest neighbor (KNN) (Sharma and 
Dash, 2014). 
 
Chan and Song (2014) extracted some pre-defined API calls categorized 
into privacy related, network related, SMS related, Wi-Fi related and 
components related API calls. They combined these features with Android 
permissions and trained 7 classifiers: Naïve Bayes, SVM, radial basis 
function (RBF), multi-layer perceptron (MLP), Liblinear, decision tree and 
random forest. They found that better classification accuracy was obtained 
by the random forest classifier when API calls were used with permissions 
compared to the use of permissions alone. Their experiments were 
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performed on a dataset of 796 samples consisting of 621 benign and 175 
malware samples. 
 
Machine learning based Android malware detection approaches have also 
been proposed that use static features derived exclusively from permissions. 
Liu et al. (2014) proposed a 2-layer permissioned based Android malware 
detection scheme. In their system, each stage utilizes a J48 decision tree 
algorithm to identify malicious applications. The first layer uses requested 
permissions and requested permission pairs, while the second layer employs 
‘used permission pairs’ extracted from Dalvik executable files. A simple 
three-step algorithm is used to obtain the overall classification decision.   
Sanz et al. (2012) evaluated simple logistic, Naïve Bayes, Bayes network, 
SVM, IBk (KNN), J48, random tree and random forest classifiers using 
permissions as features. They experimented on 249 malware samples and 
357 benign samples and obtained the best results with the random forest 
classifier (AUC=0.92). 
 
Pehlivan et al. (2014) presented experimental results on 2338 benign and 
1446 malware samples using permissions. They investigated 4 different 
feature selection methods with Naïve Bayes, classification and regression 
tree (CART), J48, SVM and random forest classifiers. Their results also 
showed that the random forest classifier exhibits the best classification 
accuracy (94.9%). Rovelli and Vigfusson (2014) presented PMBS, a 
permission-based malware detection system. PMBS extracts requested 
permissions as behavior markers and builds machine learning classifiers to 
automatically identify potentially harmful behavior. They considered C4.5, 
lazy instance based learner, repeated incremental pruning to produce error 
reduction (RIPPER) and Naïve Bayes classifiers and experimented with 
1500 benign and 1450 malware samples. They also applied the boosting 
meta-learning technique on the C4.5, RIPPER and Naïve Bayes classifiers. 
Their results showed that the ‘boosted’ C4.5 performed best with 95.22% 
accuracy. APK Auditor (Talha, Alper & Aydin, 2015) uses permissions with 
a statistical scoring approach to detect malicious Android applications. 
In contrast with the aforementioned approaches that rely on high-level pre-
defined features, such as permissions or API calls, n-grams based malware 
detection uses sequences of low-level opcodes as features. The n-gram 
features can be used to train a classifier to distinguish between malware and 
benign applications (Jerome et al., 2014), or to classify malware into 
different families (Kang et al., 2013). Perhaps surprisingly, even 1-gram 
based features, which are simply a histogram of the number of times each 
opcode is used, can be useful in distinguishing malware from benign 
applications (Canfora et al., 2015b). The length of the n-gram used (Jerome 
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et al., 2014) and number of n-grams used in classification (Canfora et al., 
2015b) can both have an effect on the accuracy of the classifier. 
 
Jerome et al. (2014) utilized opcode sequences with machine learning and 
experimented with 2, 3, 4 and 5-gram binary features. Feature ranking and 
selection were done based on computing the information gain of each n-
gram of opcode sequences found in the training sets. The authors assessed 
their approach on the Android malware genome project (AMGP) samples, 
and benign samples obtained from Google Play. They were able to achieve 
the best classification performance with the 5-gram features (average global 
F-measures close to 0.9771) by utilizing a linear SVM classifier. The paper 
only investigated malware classification into benign or suspicious and did 
not consider malware family classification. Moreover, the approach is based 
on binary occurrences of n-gram opcodes within each application and did 
not consider any frequency information associated with the n-gram opcodes 
found in each application. 
 
Unlike Jerome et al. (2014), Canfora et al. (2015a) presented results based 
on malware family classification to test their approach using (Gaussian) 
SVM and random forest classifiers. They presented results on evaluation 
with a set of trusted applications and also 10 Android malware families: 
FakeInstaller, Plankton, DroidKungFu, GinMaster, BaseBridge, ADRD, 
Kmin, Gemini, DroidDream, and Opfake. Furthermore, their experiments 
covered ranges of n from 1 to 5, i.e. up to a maximum of 5-gram opcodes 
and up to 2000 n-gram features per scheme after applying a feature selection 
algorithm. The best result reported in the paper is 96.88 % accuracy using 
the SVM classifier with 2-gram features numbering 1000. Nevertheless, the 
authors noted that higher gram features likely performed worse than 2-
grams because of the number of features used were limited to 2000 only.  
 
Note that although Kang et al. (2013), Canfora et al. (2015a), Puerta et al. 
(2015), Varsha et al. (2016) and Canfora et al. (2015c) utilized static opcode 
features, they were not based on n-grams. N-grams have recently been 
applied to system call sequences obtained from Android applications by 
Mas’ud et al. (2016). However, static opcode sequences have much less 
computational overhead compared to system call sequences since the latter 
is based on dynamic analysis.  Moreover a static feature extraction approach 
covers much more code than a dynamic approach where code coverage is an 
ongoing problem. Thus, some malware functionality may not be triggered 
leading to incomplete collection of relevant system call sequences. 
 
In this paper, a static n-gram opcode based approach is also investigated. 
However, unlike previous works we develop an approach that enables the 
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use of longer n-grams thus analyzing up to 10-grams whereas the previously 
reported works utilized up to 5-grams (Jerome et al., 2014 and Canfora et 
al., 2015a). Furthermore, unlike the work by Jerome et al. (2014) which was 
only based on binary information, we investigate both frequency and binary 
information thus allowing for greater information coverage. Finally, we also 
present some empirical findings that correlate with the overall observed 
performance trends of the n-gram opcodes on the experimental dataset used. 
 
3. N-GRAM OPCODE ANALYSIS 
In this section, we explain how to extract n-gram opcodes from Android 
applications and how to select n-gram opcodes that will enable optimal 
malware detection and categorization. The following two subsections 
describe the process of the n-gram opcode extraction and the feature 
selection and also include statistical results from our dataset. 
 
3.1. N-gram opcode extraction 
The n-gram opcode extraction consists of disassembling applications and 
extracting n-grams from opcode sequences. An Android application can be 
delivered as a compressed file, an Android application package (apk) file, 
containing a manifest file, resource files and Dalvik executable (dex) files. 
The dex files contain the application bytecode and can be disassembled 
using baksmali (http://baksmali.com). As a result of disassembling, 
baksmali generates a set of smali files for the dex file, where each smali file 
represents a single class that contains all the methods of the class. Each 
method contains human-readable Dalvik bytecode (hereafter instructions) 
and each instruction consists of a single opcode and multiple operands. 
 
We discard the operands and only extract n-grams from opcode sequences 
of the methods. The resulting output of the n-gram opcode extraction is a 
vector of unique n-gram opcodes from all the classes of the application. The 
vector contains the frequency of each unique n-gram opcode. The overview 
of the n-gram opcode extraction is shown in Figure 1 and there are five main 
groups of opcodes obtainable from the Dalvik bytecode (Bartel, Klien, Le 
Traon, & Monperrus, 2012). These include: 
 
• Move instructions (0x01 to 0x1C) 
• Branch instructions (0x27 to 0x3D) 
• Getter and setter instructions (0x44 to 0x6D) 
• Method invoke instructions (0x6E to 0x78) 
• Logic and arithmetic instructions (0x7B to 0xE2) 
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Figure 1. N-gram opcode extraction process. 
 
Any n-gram based method faces the prospect of exponential increase in the 
number of unique n-grams as n is increased. Hence, it was expected that a 
similar trend would be observed with n-gram opcodes as well. Figure 2 and 
Table 1 show the number of unique n-gram opcodes for different n values 
from our dataset, which consists of 1260 samples of malware and 1260 
benign samples. In the malware detection (MD) study, we processed the n-
gram opcode extraction on all the 2520 samples and counted the number of 
unique n-opcodes for different n, with n ranging from 1 to 10. In the 
malware categorization (MC) study, we conducted the same process on 
1260 malware samples. 
 
 
Figure 2. The number of unique n-gram opcodes vs. n. 
 
It can be observed that there is no exponential increase in the number of 
unique n-gram opcodes. Instead, it increases linearly at first and then 
gradually becomes stable. A probable reason for this is that some methods 
may contain less instructions than n therefore those n-gram opcodes will not 
appear in such methods. Another reason is that a bigger n is likely to 
generate a smaller number of n-gram opcodes than a smaller n generates 
from the same method. For example, a method with 7 instructions has 6 
pieces of 2-gram opcodes, 5 pieces of 3-gram opcodes, 4 pieces of 4-gram 
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opcodes and so on. Therefore, the maximum number of unique n-gram 
opcodes for a method is in inverse proportion to n. In the MC study, the 
number of unique n-gram opcodes also becomes stable despite utilizing only 
malware samples for the study. Even though there is no exponential 
increase, nonetheless an excessive number of unique n-gram opcodes that 
could cause a huge overhead in further processes results. The number of the 
unique 10-gram opcodes in MD and MC were observed to be 37,186,183 
(about 37M) and 2,823,729 (about 2.8M), respectively. 
 
Table 1. The number of unique n-gram opcodes for different values of n. 
n MD MC 
1 214 210 
2 22,371 14,550 
3 399,598 154,483 
4 2,201,377 557,526 
5 6,458,246 1,145,025 
6 12,969,857 1,724,771 
7 20,404,473 2,177,621 
8 27,366,890 2,491,721 
9 33,024,116 2,695,226 
10 37,186,183 2,823,729 
 
3.2. Feature selection 
Since the number of unique n-gram opcodes is excessive, it is difficult to 
run machine learning algorithms on the original data. A solution is feature 
selection i.e. a process of identifying the best features and is a widely used 
approach to filter out less important features. In the feature selection stage, 
we measure the information gain of each feature and subsequently filter out 
the less important features that have low information gain. 
 
Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty of a random variable. The entropy of 
a variable X is defined in (1) below and the entropy of X after observing 
values of a variable Y is defined in (2), where P(xi) is the prior probabilities 
for all values of X and P(xi|yi) is the posterior probabilities of X given the 
values of Y. 
 
(1)   H(X) = –∑P(xi)log2(P(xi))                                       
 
(2)  H(X/Y) = –∑P(yj) ∑P(xi/yj)log2(P(xi/yj))                               
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The amount by which the entropy of X decreases reflects additional 
information about X provided by Y and is called information gain (Quinlan, 
1993), given by (3). 
 
(3)   IG(X/Y) = H(X) – H(X/Y)                                        
 
According to this measure, a feature Y is regarded as a better indicator than 
a feature Z for a class X, if IG(X|Y) > IG(X|Z). We rank the features by the 
information gain and select the high ranked features. In order to compute the 
IG, we used an implementation of the information gain in WEKA (Hall et 
al., 2009). However, the program could not handle the large data input from 
the n-gram opcode feature files and frequently encountered an out of 
memory error (on a Linux PC with 32GB RAM). So in order to overcome 
this problem, we segmented the data into several smaller chunks (in multiple 
.arff files) and computed the information gain on smaller data. This worked 
because the information gain algorithm computes a score for each feature 
independently. Hence, we processed the information gain on each smaller 
set of features and merged the results together at the end as illustrated in 
Figure 3. This ‘data segmentation’ approach to the feature selection allowed 
us to overcome the memory limitation problem and thus experiment on 
larger n-gram opcode features. 
 
 
Figure 3. Overview of our analysis process illustrating feature segmentation 
applied to the feature selection stage.  
 
Figure 4 and Table 2 show the number of selected n-gram opcodes with the 
information gain greater than 0.1 for different n. As the table illustrates, the 
number of selected n-gram opcodes increased as n becomes larger. This 
means that we gain more information by increasing n. However, the 
increase in the number of selected n-gram opcodes reaches a saturation 
point as n increases. Because of this observation, we expect that impact of 
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the increase in n on classification accuracy to peak at this saturation point 
where further increase in n will have little effect. Another interesting 
observation is that the number of selected n-gram opcodes for frequency is 
slightly higher than the number of selected n-gram opcodes for binary. Note 
that frequency and binary refer to the number of counts of the n-gram 
opcode. For the former it is the overall count, while for the latter it is 1 or 0 
denoting presence and absence respectively. 
 
 
Figure 4. The number of selected n-gram opcodes vs. n. 
 
Table 2. The number of selected n-gram opcodes. 
n 
MD MC 
Binary Frequency Binary Frequency 
1 29 191 164 199 
2 2,121 4,155 4,567 4,973 
3 12,802 18,411 20,376 21,851 
4 30,293 37,992 43,538 46,253 
5 44,532 51,845 64,450 67,837 
6 51,213 56,850 78,453 81,736 
7 53,079 57,086 86,146 88,839 
8 53,139 55,856 90,024 92,076 
9 52,857 54,837 91,966 93,600 
10 52,588 54,080 92,878 94,239 
 
4. EVALUATION 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of n-gram opcodes for malware 
detection and categorization with different n. Evaluation and detailed 
analyses for malware detection and categorization are presented in the 
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following subsections. In each subsection, we also compare the performance 
of two different data types: binary and frequency.  
Our dataset consists of malware from the Android malware genome project 
(Zhou & Jiang, 2012) and has a total of 2520 applications, of which 1260 
are benign and 1260 are malware from 49 different malware families. 
Labels are provided for the malware family of each sample. The benign 
samples were collected from the Google Play store and have been checked 
using VirusTotal (http://www.virustotal.com) to ascertain that they were 
highly probable to be malware free. We use four different machine learning 
algorithms: Naïve Bayes (NB), support vector machine (SVM), partial 
decision tree (PART) and random forest (RF) and utilize WEKA as the 
framework. The following experimental results are reported using the 
weighted average f-measure, which is based on the precision and recall, 
over 10-fold cross validation. 
 
4.1. Malware detection 
In the malware detection study, samples are classified into one of two 
classes: benign or malware. We evaluated the performance of malware 
detection with two different data types of n-gram opcodes: binary and 
frequency. 
 
 
Figure 5. Malware detection results with binary n-gram opcodes.  
 
Figure 5 shows the results of the binary n-gram opcodes. With the exception 
of NB, the performances of the other three algorithms were similar although 
SVM shows the best performance in most cases. The f-measure increases as 
n is increased but no more increase is observed when n is greater than 3. The 
f-measure even tends to decrease when n is greater than 7. This trend is 
similar with the change in the number of selected n-gram opcodes in Figure 
4. NB shows the worst performance but shows the same trend. The best f-
measure is 98% and SVM performed with the best f-measure when n is 3. 
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Figure 6. Malware detection results with frequency n-gram opcodes.  
 
As shown in Figure 6, the frequency n-gram opcodes show similar results 
with the binary n-gram opcodes. One interesting observation is that the 
frequency n-gram opcodes show a good performance when n is 1 (i.e. no n-
gram is applied) compared to the binary n-gram opcodes. 
 
Table 3. Top ten binary n-gram opcodes for malware detection.  
Rank 
Our Findings Jerome (2014) 
3 4 5 5 
1 08076e 6e0c086e# 6e0c086e0c# 136e6e6e0c 
2 08546e# 08546e0c# 2038071f6e# 1c6e6e0c6e* 
3 0c086e 0c086e0c# 0854380854# 1d546e0a39 
4 220870# 08546e0a# 38071f6e0a# 210135461a 
5 12086e# 08540854# 0854085408# 0c1a6e0a33 
6 390f6e# 38071f6e# 0c08546e0c# 12123c0e22* 
7 085412# 390f6e0a# 0c086e0c6e# 7154626e28 
8 390f54 08543808# 08546e0854# 6e2820381f 
9 085208# 08076e0c 20381f2822 0d076e289c* 
10 085438# 3808546e# 08546e0c08# 16313d740e* 
 
Table 3 shows the top ten binary n-gram opcodes for malware detection (see 
the translation at Appendix). We also present the top ten 5-gram opcodes of 
Jerome et al. (2014) (which were the only ones provided) to compare with 
our findings. Even though no same 5-gram opcodes commonly appear 
between the two top ten 5-gram opcodes (in the two rightmost columns), we 
found six of the top ten 5-gram opcodes from Jerome et al. (2014) , 
highlighted in the last column, in our selected 5-gram opcodes as the 
11770th, 12597th, 13241th, 13260th, 15927th and 25662th ranked features, 
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respectively. This could be attributed to the fact that our benign samples 
differed even though we utilized the same malware samples as Jerome et al. 
(2014). An interesting observation is that three of the overlapping n-gram 
opcodes (‘12123c0e22’, ‘0d076e289c’ and ‘16313d740e’) are also only 
found in malware samples just as observed by Jerome et al. (2014). Another 
observation is that our top hundred 5-gram opcodes are mostly found in 
benign samples. As we highlighted n-gram opcodes only found in benign 
samples with ‘#’, it can be seen from the table that there were more of the 
top ten n-gram opcodes only found in benign samples. This would indicate 
that the unique n-gram opcodes from benign samples were a strong 
contributing factor for malware detection. 
 
Another interesting observation is that three 4-gram opcodes (‘08546e0c’, 
‘08546e0a’ and ‘3808546e’) were extensions of the second ranked 3-gram 
opcode ‘08546e’. We refer to these extensions as extended n-gram opcodes, 
which includes at least one (n-1)-gram opcode as a prefix or suffix. For 
example, ‘08546e0c’ includes ‘08546e’ as a prefix and ‘3808546e’ includes 
‘08546e’ as a suffix. If an n-gram opcode does not include any (n-1)-gram 
opcode as a prefix or suffix, we refer to this n-gram opcode as a new n-gram 
opcode. A (n-1)-gram opcode usually produces multiple extended n-gram 
opcodes which provide more precise information of opcode sequences. In 
contrast, new n-gram opcodes provide the information of new opcode 
sequences. In order to investigate the impact of new and extended n-gram 
opcodes on the classification accuracy, additional analysis has been 
conducted as follows. 
 
 
Figure 7. The number of new and extended n-gram opcodes for binary.  
 
Figure 7 shows the number of new and extended n-gram opcodes for the 
binary data type. The number of new n-gram opcodes increased until n 
reaches 4 and them decreased with higher values of n. It means that we 
extracted less information of new opcode sequences at high values of n. 
This observation might be one of reasons why the classification accuracy 
 14 
has been observed to saturate at lower values of n, i.e. from 2 to 4, even 
though the number of selected n-gram opcodes was still on the increase. 
Note that the number of selected n-gram opcodes saturated when n was 6 or 
7, but the classification accuracy saturated when n was 3 or 4 (see Figure 4 
and 5). Figure 8 supports this argument as well, by showing that the 
proportion of new n-gram opcodes became less than the proportion of 
extended n-gram opcodes. 
 
 
Figure 8. The proportion of new and extension n-gram opcodes for binary.  
 
As explained before, extended n-gram opcodes include one (n-1)-gram 
opcode as a prefix or suffix. However, there is a special case that an 
extended n-gram opcode includes two (n-1)-gram opcodes both as a prefix 
and a suffix. For example, ‘3808546e’ includes ‘380854’ as a prefix and 
‘08546e’ as a suffix. We call these extended n-gram opcodes as overlaps of 
two (n-1)-gram opcodes. According to Figure 9 and 10, the number and the 
proportion of the overlaps were larger than those of prefix and suffix when n 
was higher than 4. This analysis shows that most of selected n-gram 
opcodes were extended n-gram opcodes and most of extended n-gram 
opcodes were overlaps when the classification accuracy has been saturated. 
 
 
Figure 9. The number of each type of extension: prefix, suffix, or overlaps 
(for binary).  
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Figure 10. The proportion of each type of extension: prefix, suffix or 
overlaps (for binary).  
 
 
Figure 11. The number of new and extension n-grams (for frequency).  
 
 
Figure 12. The number of new n-grams (for frequency features). 
 
As shown Figure 11 and 12, the number and proportion of new n-gram 
opcodes were very small compared to those of extended n-gram opcodes. 
Similar to the case of the binary data type, most of extended n-gram opcodes 
were also overlaps (see Figure 13). Note that the classification accuracy of 
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the frequency data type becomes saturated at an earlier point compared to 
the detection accuracy of the binary type (see Figures 5 and 6). 
 
 
Figure 13. The number of each type of extension: prefix, suffix or overlaps 
(for frequency).  
 
In terms of classification accuracy, SVM showed the best performance in 
the most cases. However, the accuracy is not the only factor when choosing 
a machine learning algorithm. Another factor is the speed performance and 
Table 4 shows the time overhead of the machine learning algorithms from 
the malware detection with the binary n-gram opcodes. RF showed the best 
performance in terms of both training and prediction speeds. Even though 
PART has the highest training overhead it is still considered a suitable 
classifier because once trained, classification is fast as well. 
 
Table 4. Time overhead of the machine learning algorithms. 
n 
Machine Learning Algorithms 
NB SVM PART RF 
1 0.02/0.01 1/0 0.14/0 0.14/0 
2 0.31/0.22 1.53/0.01 3.26/0 0.27/0 
3 2.18/1.5 5.65/0.03 25.82/0 0.34/0.01 
4 6.41/3.36 12.8/0.1 62.38/0.01 0.51/0.01 
5 11.34/5.02 19.17/0.25 106.13/0.02 0.74/0.02 
6 14.66/5.96 22.32/0.32 191.06/0.02 0.96/0.02 
7 14.23/6.24 24.45/0.38 176.92/0.02 1.15/0.02 
8 13.42/5.97 21.17/0.38 169.25/0.02 1.88/0.02 
9 13.05/5.99 21.29/0.39 157.95/0.01 4.17/0.02 
10 13.36/5.95 27.26/0.36 159.1/0.01 6.07/0.02 
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4.2. Malware categorization 
In the malware categorization study, samples are classified into one of 
existing malware families. We also evaluated the performance of malware 
categorization with two different data types of n-gram opcodes. Figure 14 
shows the results of binary n-gram opcodes which depicts a similar trend to 
the malware detection results. SVM shows the best f-measure of 98%, with 
its f-measure becoming steady when n is 4. 
 
 
Figure 14. Malware categorization results with binary n-gram opcodes.  
 
Figure 15 shows the results of frequency n-gram opcodes for malware 
categorization. Again, SVM shows the best f-measure of 98%, when n is 6 
but SVM and PART show a high f-measure of 95%, when n reaches only 2. 
The frequency 1-gram opcodes do not show a better performance compared 
to the binary 1-gram opcodes, as it does in malware detection. In contrast to 
malware detection, malware categorization is a multi-class classification, 
which is considered to be a more difficult problem compared to the binary 
classification. 
 
 
Figure 15. Malware categorization results with frequency n-gram opcodes.  
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Table 5 shows the top ten binary n-gram opcodes for malware 
categorization. Since we have no data from other research for comparison, 
we only analyze our data for malware categorization. We observed that 
there is no n-gram opcode that was found only (exclusively) in a single 
family within the top ten n-gram opcodes. 
 
Table 5. Top ten frequency n-gram opcode for malware categorization.  
Rank 
n 
3 4 5 
1 36121a 700c390e 22621a701a 
2 3c0e22 621a701a 621a701a71 
3 1a1607 123c0e22 123c0e2270 
4 616174 12123c0e 3c0e22706e 
5 3b7428 313b7428 12123c0e22 
6 313b74 3c0e2270 0c6e0c236e 
7 123c0e 1a706e15 6e0a386e71 
8 3d740e 3922701c 0c22702271 
9 0a8104 3d740e0d 0c1a221a6e 
10 289c08 8104085a 0c1a706e15 
 
In our evaluation, it is apparent that the binary n-gram opcodes are more 
accurate than the frequency n-gram opcodes. Another advantage of the 
binary n-gram opcode is that we can reduce the storage overhead as 
mentioned in (Jerome et al., 2014). However, the frequency n-gram opcodes 
show very good accuracy when n is small. This means that the frequency n-
gram opcodes with small n can be chosen for light-weight use case 
scenarios. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigated and analyzed n-gram opcode based static 
analysis approach to Android malware detection. This approach eliminates 
the need for prior expert or domain knowledge based features. Unlike most 
previous works that utilize pre-defined features like API calls, permissions, 
intents and other application properties, our method allows for automatic 
extraction and learning of features from given datasets. Furthermore, we 
achieved analysis with longer n-grams than the state-of-the art by utilizing 
up to 10-gram opcodes in our experiments compared to the currently 
reported maximum of 5 in the literature. This was possible using a data 
segmentation technique during pre-processing in order to enable feature 
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selection on as large a dataset as possible. Our results showed that by using 
frequency n-gram opcodes with low n, good classification accuracy can be 
achieved. Nevertheless, a maximum f-measure of 98% in both malware 
detection and categorization were obtained with n=3 and n=4, respectively. 
We also showed that the presence of overlapping and extended n-gram 
opcodes were in correlation with the overall detection accuracy results. 
Nevertheless, we intend to investigate this aspect further. For future work, 
experimenting on larger datasets would be considered. We would also like 
to investigate the performance of mixed feature sets comprising different 
lengths of n-grams, especially those that do not overlap across different n 
values. 
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APPENDIX  
 
1. 08 07 6e 6.    39 0f 6e 
move-object/from16  if-nez  
move-object  return  
invoke-virtual  invoke-virtual  
2. 08 65 6e 7.     08 54 12 
move-object/from16  move-object/from16  
sget-char  iget-object  
invoke-virtual  const/4  
3. 0c 08 6e 8.     39 0f 54 
move-result-object  if-nez  
move-object/from16  return  
invoke-virtual  iget-object  
4. 22 08 70 9.   08 52 08 
new-instance  move-object/from16  
move-object/from16  iget  
invoke-direct  move-object/from16  
5. 12 08 6e 10.     08 54 38 
const/4  move-object/from16  
move-object/from16  iget-object  
invoke-virtual  if-eqz  
Table 6. Top 10 3-gram opcodes from malware detection. 
 
1. 6e 0c 08 6e 6. 38 07 1f 6e 
invoke-virtual  if-eqz  
move-result-object  move-object  
move-object/from16  check-cast  
invoke-virtual  invoke-virtual  
2. 08 54 6e 0c 7. 39 0f 6e 0a 
move-object/from16  if-nez  
iget-object  return  
invoke-virtual  invoke-virtual  
move-result-object  move-result  
3. 0c 08 6e 0c 8. 08 54 38 08 
move-result-object  move-object/from16  
move-object/from16  iget-object  
invoke-virtual  if-eqz  
move-result-object  move-object/from16  
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4. 08 54 6e 0a 9. 08 07 6e 0c 
move-object/from16  move-object/from16  
iget-object  move-object  
invoke-virtual  invoke-virtual  
move-result  move-result-object  
5. 08 54 08 54 10. 38 08 54 6e 
move-object/from16  if-eqz  
iget-object  move-object/from16  
move-object/from16  iget-object  
iget-object  invoke-virtual  
Table 7. Top 10 4-gram opcodes from malware detection.  
 
1. 6e 0c 08 6e 0c 6. 0c 08 54 6e 0c 
invoke-virtual  move-result-object  
move-result-object  move-object/from16  
move-object/from16  iget-object  
invoke-virtual  invoke-virtual  
move-result-object  move-result-object  
2. 20 38 07 1f 6e 7. 0c 08 6e 0c 6e 
instance-of  move-result-object  
if-eqz  move-object/from16  
move-object  invoke-virtual  
check-cast  move-result-object  
invoke-virtual  invoke-virtual  
3. 08 54 38 08 54 8. 08 54 6e 08 54 
move-object/from16  move-object/from16  
iget-object  iget-object  
if-eqz  invoke-virtual  
move-object/from16  move-object/from16  
iget-object  iget-object  
4. 38 07 1f 6e 0a 9. 20 38 1f 28 22 
if-eqz  instance-of  
move-object  if-eqz  
check-cast  check-cast  
invoke-virtual  goto  
move-result  new-instance  
5. 08 54 08 54 08 10. 08 54 6e 0c 08 
move-object/from16  move-object/from16  
iget-object  iget-object  
move-object/from16  invoke-virtual  
iget-object  move-result-object  
move-object/from16  move-object/from16  
Table 8. Top 10 5-gram opcode from malware detection.  
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